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THE QUALITY OF JUDGESt
ROBERT

A. LEFLARtt

To talk about "the quality of judges" implies there are some judges
whose quality is good and others who are not so good. Of course there
is more than one standard for determining whether a judge is "good."
A standard sometimes applied makes quality depend on whether the
judge decides for or against the one who is doing the talking about the
judge, but that is a standard seldom used, at least by lawyers who have a
fair amount of practice. More common among lawyers is a standard
under which every judge, during the whole period that he remains on the
bench, is a good judge. Unlike that of the Indian-fighters of the old
West, the lawyer's attitude may be that the only bad judges are dead
judges, or possibly judges who sit in other jurisdictions in which the particular lawyer does not practice. Things have to get pretty bad before a
lawyer will take any public position other than that the judges before
whom he practices are excellent judges. I am going to assume, as do
practically all the lawyers who are here tonight, that every judge in Indiana is a good and able judge. What I may have to say about avoiding
the selection of poor judges therefore has future application altogether;
in the very nature of things, by definition, it cannot apply to any presently sitting Indiana judges, and I know you would not want it to apply
to any of them. But the future is pretty important. We are properly
t This address was delivered at the Indiana World War Memorial, Indianapolis,
Indiana, February 18, 1960, and was sponsored by the Indiana University School of Law
in cooperation with the Indiana State Bar Association as the first of the 1960 Addison
C. Harris Memorial Lectures. These lectures were inaugurated in 1958, and have been
heretofore published in Volumes 33 and 34 of this Journal.
The Addison C. Harris Memorial Lectures are made possible by a trust created by
Mrs. India Crago Harris upon her death in 1946, in memory of her late husband. Addison C. Harris (1840-1916) was a distinguished Indiana lawyer and statesman. He was
a member of the State Senate and Minister to Austria-Hungary during the administration of President McKinley. Mr. Harris also served as President of the Indiana Law
School, of the Indiana State Bar Association, and of the Board of Trustees of Purdue
University.
" tRobert A. Leflar is Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of
Arkansas, and Director of the Appellate Judges Seminar, New York University.
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concerned about the judges who will sit here after the present judges are
gone, and after we are gone too.
The business of improving the quality of our judiciary, which is
actually directed at improving the quality of the judiciary's performance
of its official duties, has, I submit, three major aspects. These are:
(1) The selection of judges, which includes not only the initial
appointment or election, but re-elections if a judge is named not for life
but for a term only, and also includes retirement since that process too
determines in a negative way who sits on the bench. There has been
some tendency on the public's part to feel that only the selection process
has relevance to improvement of the judiciary, and we must agree that
much of it centers here, but not quite all of it.
(2) The continuing education of judges after they enter upon
their judicial careers. There are few of us who ever become so learned,
or so wise, that we cannot improve ourselves. We know this is true of
lawyers and law teachers, and I venture to suggest that it is true of
judges also.
(3)
The education of the public, both members of the bar and
laymen, on the nature of the judicial function, on what judges do and
what enables them to do their job well, or disables them. Public understanding of the judge's situation, and of his job, can create a social, legal
and judicial climate encouraging the judge to better performance, and
assuring that the judge will get reasonable credit for doing a good job if
he does it.
I want to spend most of my time this evening on the first of these
three aspects of judicial improvement-the selection of judges-though
I will come back to the other two aspects later.
THE SELECTION OF JUDGES

A little personal history may help to explain my own attitude toward
improvement of the processes of judicial selection. I have participated
in two attempts, both unsuccessful, to "improve" the judiciary of my
home state of Arkansas.
The first was back in 1942, when I was a candidate for election as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of that state. I got licked. The
licking was by a narrow enough margin that I did not lose my faith in
the voters as a part of the selective process, but it was conclusive just the
same.' My memory of that experience was revived by a little item to
which my attention was called recently, entitled "How to Be Elected
1.

The author's service on the Arkansas Supreme Court came several years later,

when he filled out an unexpired term by gubernatorial appointment.
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Judge in Detroit." It has to do with the selection of a Circuit Judge for
Wayne County, Michigan, and I think it is worth quoting:
Applicants for this position should possess the digestion
of an ostrich, a firm right hand with a capacity of at least 3,000
shakes a day, a keen memory for faces and names, dignity
tempered by geniality and affability, a fluent tongue coupled
with the ability to talk to all sorts and conditions of men-and
women-and say nothing offensive and leave the listeners with
an impression that the speaker is a person of vast wisdom, good
humor and tolerance.
Applicants also should be able to attend a series of luncheons, club and lodge meetings, smokers, dances, a banquet or
two, and several sports events in the course of a day and yet
find time to attend to the exacting duties of the bench. This, of
course, presupposes the physical strength to get along with little
or no sleep.
Applicants should also possess a commanding presence,
particularly because of the necessity of winning the confidence
and esteem of the women. And, naturally, the applicants must
possess the specialized education and training necessary for a
circuit judge.
If you believe we have overdrawn the case, stir about town
a little and observe the actions of the members of the circuit
bench, all of whom are candidates for re-election this spring.
None has yet blossomed out as a song and dance artist, but
short of that they seem to be omitting nothing calculated to win
the voters' favor. We might imagine from the newspapers
these days that they are everywhere but on the bench.
The second unsuccessful effort in which I was involved, to improve
the judiciary of Arkansas, was as a member of a Commission set up in
the 194 0's to prepare, as a proposed constitutional amendment, a redraft
of the Judiciary article of the Arkansas Constitution. We were directed
to provide for as nearly an ideal judicial set-up as we could, not for an
imaginary state, of course, but an ideal set-up for Arkansas, a state where
the Jacksonian democratic tradition of an elective judiciary is very similar to that which prevails in Indiana.
In preparation for that task, we made a fairly thorough study of
2. This is part of an editorial in a Detroit newspaper, quoted in 12 J. Am. Jim.

Soc'y 186 (1929).
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judicial selection methods throughout the common law world.3 A partial
summary of what we learned by means of that study, brought up to date
to include developments in the last ten years, is relevant to your interests
in Indiana.
As to England, we learned that all judicial appointments are made,
for life of course, in the name of the Crown, though actually by the
Prime Minister, and in fact on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor's office. The latter maintains a small permanent staff which is
constantly engaged in accumulating information and preparing files on
barristers who may be considered for major judgeships. Recommendations from the Lord Chancellor's office are nonpartisan, and the record
shows that appointments are not based on membership in the party in
power.' There can be no doubt that in England training and apparent
capacity for judicial work are the true bases for judicial appointments.
The American federal selection system was familiar to all of us,
with judges named by the President for life, subject to the "advice and
consent" of the Senate. We knew that this system has been widely
praised, but we also learned that many intelligent and responsible critics
regard it as far less than perfect.' A few of the states, notably Massachusetts, New Jersey and some of the New England states, followed
essentially the same system, with gubernatorial appointments, and in one
or two of the states appointments are made, strangely enough, by the
legislature. In 35 of the states all or nearly all of the judges have been
elected by the people, at least theoretically in the same way that governors
and Congressmen are elected. A few states, particularly Missouri and
California, had unique systems of judicial selection.
We were especially interested in the Missouri system.6 This system
was based on one formally approved as a model plan for judicial selection by the American Bar Association' in 1937, this in turn being based
on a proposal made by Albert M. Kales of Chicago in 1913. Its key
agency is the "judicial commission" which exists at two levels. The
Appellate Judicial Commission has seven members: three lawyers, one
3.

Generally, see Stason, JudicialSelection Around the World, 41 J. Am.

JUD.

Soc'Y

134 (1958).
4. See Coldstream, Judicial Appointments in England, 43 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 41
(1959) ; Goddard, Politics and the British Bench, 43 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 124 (1959). As
to Canadian methods, see Clark, Appointments to the Bench, 30 CAN. B. REv. 28 (1952).
5. See Miller, Federal Judicial Appointments: The Continuing Struggle for Good
Judges, 42 A.B.A.J. 128 (1955) ; Miller, The Selection of the Federal Judiciary: The
Profession Is Neglecting Its Duty, 45 A.B.A.J. 445 (1959) ; Cooley, The Department of
J stice and Judicial Nominations, 42 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 86 (1958).
6. Mo. CONST., art. V, § 29 (1945).

7. Recorded in 62

REPORT OF

THE

A.B.A. 1033 (1937), and discussed in Wood,

Basic Propositions Relating to Judicial Selection, 23 A.B.A.J. 102 (1937).

THE QUALITY OF JUDGES

293

elected from each of the intermediate Court of Appeals districts by the
lawyers of the district; three laymen, one appointed from each of the
same three districts by the Governor; and the Chief Justice of the state,
who serves as Chairman. This commission deals with vacancies on the
Supreme Court and the three intermediate appellate courts. A similar
Circuit Judicial Commission exists for St. Louis County and one for
Jackson County (Kansas City), and these deal with Circuit, Probate and
Criminal court vacancies in those counties. The system has not been
applied to local courts in the rural counties. Commission members are
named to six-year terms, staggered, and there is no reappointment.
When a judicial vacancy occurs in Missouri, the appropriate judicial
commission nominates three qualified candidates. The Governor designates one of these as the judge. The newly named judge serves until the
next general election more than twelve months after his appointment,
then his name goes on a separate nonpartisan judicial ballot, with the
question "Shall Judge
be retained in office? Yes. No."
If the vote is favorable, an appellate judge serves a twelve-year term, a
trial judge six years, after which the ballot process is repeated if the judge
wishes to seek another term. If the vote is unfavorable, or if a vacancy
arises for any other reason, the vacancy is filled in the same manner.
Sitting judges were blanketed in when the plan first became effective.
By 1959 Missouri had filled 44 judicial vacancies under its new system.8 Seven of these were in the Supreme Court, ten in the three intermediate appellate courts and 27 in the St. Louis and Jackson county trial
courts. Of the 44 vacancies, 18 came from death, 12 from retirement,
six from resignation or non-candidacy for re-election and one from rejection at election. There is no thought in Missouri of abandoning the
plan.' Originally proposed by initiated act (with 100,000 signatures) it
was adopted by a 90,000 majority of the popular vote in 1940, then under
a legislative-ordered referendum was again approved in 1942 by more
than a two-to-one vote (180,000 majority), then in 1945 was written into a new Constitution proposed in Missouri which, though attacked because it included the judicial selection plan, was approved overwhelmingly.
The California plan,1" somewhat similar to M\'issouri's, was adopted
as an initiated measure in 1934 by a substantial popular vote. Under it,
the Governor appoints new judges on his own initiative, but each appointS. Hemker, Experience Under the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan (address delivered at Nat'l Conference on Judicial Selection and Court Administration, Chicago,
Ill., Nov. 22-24, 1959).
9. See Crowdus, The Missouri Experience with Judicial Selection and Tenure, 25
J.B.A. KAN. 1 (1956) ; Hyde, The Missouri Method of Choosing Judges, 41 J. Am. JUD.
Soc'y 74 (1957).
10. CAL. CONST., art. VI, § 26.
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ment has to be confirmed by a three-man commission consisting of the
Chief Justice, the Attorney General and the presiding judge of one of
the state's intermediate appellate courts. After each judge's appointment, and at the end of each judge's term, the judge's name goes on the
be
ballot, without an opponent, with the question "Shall
elected to the office of judge? Yes. No." This method of selection
does not operate as to the local courts in any particular county until it has
been approved by the voters of the county.
In summary these were the plans we had before us when our Arkansas group prepared to draft its plan. We did not choose to follow exactly
any of the earlier plans. Our effort was to develop an ideal plan for
our state, according to our best lights.
The key agency in our plan, as we developed it," was to be called
the Judicial Council. It was to have broad powers including, in addition
to a part in the judicial selection process, the duty of organizing a judicial
conference, integrating the bar, removing judges under certain circumstances, disciplining members of the bar, regulating admissions to the
bar, promulgating rules of procedure, and controlling an administrative
office of the courts. The Judicial Council was to consist of eleven (or
thirteen) persons, the members being the Chief Justice as presiding officer, four trial judges selected by all the judges of courts of record in the
state, four lawyers elected by all the members of the state's bar, and either
two or four laymen appointed by the Governor. Other details, including
staggered terms and geographical distribution, were spelled out.
The method of filling a Supreme Court vacancy was for the members of the state bar to nominate, by some preferential elective process,
three qualified persons, from whom the Judicial Council would appoint
one to serve until the next general election more than two years after his
designation, his name then to go on the ballot without an opponent but
be continued in office?
with the question "Shall Judge
Yes. No." If the vote was affirmative the judge would serve an eightyear term then go on the ballot again; if negative, the selection process
would be repeated anew. Vacancies in the trial courts would be filled
and trial judges voted on in the same manner, except that the three nominees would be named by the members of the district bar only, before
appointment by the Judicial Council, and trial judges would serve sixyear terms between elections. The difference in length of terms was
merely copied from existing practice.
11. Successive drafts of the plan appear in reports published in 2 ARK. L. REv. 174
(1948) and 4 ARK. L. REv. 155 (1950).
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Virtues which were believed to justify the Arkansas plan's departure
from other methods of selection included:
(1) Further removal of the selection from politics than would
be possible if the Governor made the appointments;
(2) The preservation of direct judicial responsibility to the
people but without the false assumption that the mass of
voters are in a position to make wise judicial selections
in the first place;
(3) Giving the bar which practices before the court, and which
knows the qualifications of its members better than anyone
else, a direct part in the selection process.
This Arkansas plan was never put on the ballot. It failed without ever
being voted on. Why?
There was vigorous opposition. This came largely from members
of the legal profession, including a few judges. I am inclined to think
that a majority of the lawyers favored it, though this was never made
clear. It is certain that a great number of the civic-minded citizenry,
among non-lawyers, favored it. Here again, however, public sentiment
was never clarified because the facts and arguments were never presented
to the people, or at least not to very many of them. Why was the plan
laid on the shelf without being fully debated, without the people being
given a chance to vote on it?
As I look back on it, perhaps a bit nostalgically, I am inclined to
think that some of us just got scared, that we simply lacked the guts to
get into the kind of statewide battle that would have been involved. The
fight would have been a hard one, as it was in Missouri. I still think it
could have been won, as it was there, and subsequent events in other
states strengthen that bit of guessing by hindsight. Of course I can
speak only for myself, as to why we did not make the fight. I know that
those of us who prepared the plan were drafted for the job, and we accepted the assignment as one to write up an ideal judicial selection plan,
not as one to conduct a statewide campaign for its adoption. For my
own part, too, I felt that there is much less need for change in methods
of judicial selection in rural areas than in metropolitan areas, and Arkansas is essentially a rural state. You will have to decide for yourselves
how far reasons such as these have relevancy in Indiana. Of one thing,
though, I am convinced. This is that any broad, extensive judicial reform that may be accomplished anywhere will have to be accomplished
with the active cooperation of non-lawyer groups, such as the newspaper
editors, the clergy, the Chambers of Commerce, the bankers associations
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and other business and professional groups, the labor unions, the League
of Women Voters, the organized and thinking citizenry in general. The
lawyers and the bar associations can furnish leadership, but they cannot
get the job done by themselves. This is true because, if for no other
reason, there will always, on any matter of reform in the law, be a
vigorous and active group of lawyers in opposition. This will often be
a large group too, and sometimes it will be a majority of the bar. This
was Chief Justice Vanderbilt's experience in New Jersey. It was the
Missouri experience; it was the experience in Kansas a little over a year
ago. It will be your experience here in Indiana, as it already has been
your experience in other efforts to improve the law that you have made
in years gone by.
There has been some real progress in judicial selection methods in
other states during the last ten years. Thus, Kansas in 1958 adopted a
constitutional amendment12 applying the essentials of neighboring Missouri's system to the Kansas Supreme Court. There a "Supreme Court
Nominating Commission" will be made up of one lawyer from each Congressional district elected by all the lawyers of the district, one non-lawyer
chosen by the Governor from each Congressional district, and a lawyer
chairman elected by the whole bar of the state. This Commission will
nominate for each court vacancy three lawyers from whom the Governor
will designate one as judge; if the Governor does not act within sixty
days the Chief Justice will name one of the three as judge. The new
judge's name will go on the ballot at the next election after serving one
year, without an opponent, with the question "Shall
of the
Supreme Court be retained in office?" The Kansas court term is six
years, and other details are similar to those in Missouri.
The two new states have adopted interesting judicial selection systems. Alaska 3 follows the Missouri plan as to all its judges. Their
Judicial Council consists of seven members: three lawyers named by the
bar of the state, three non-lawyers named by the Governor, and the Chief
Justice as chairman. The Judicial Council nominates "two or more"
lawyers for each court vacancy, the Governor appoints one of the nominees, and the new judge serves three years before his name goes on a
nonpartisan ballot for approval or rejection. The new constitution of
Hawaii14 provides that the judges of all courts shall be nominated and
appointed by the Governor, with Senate confirmation, but subject to the
12. Amendment adopted Nov. 4, 1958, reprinted in 42 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 129 (1958).
13. ALASKA CO NST., art. IV, §§ 1-16, reprinted in 42 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 54 (1958).
14. The Judiciary article of Hawaii's new Constitution is copied in full in 43 J. Am.
Jun. Soc'x 16 (1959).
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condition that no nomination shall be sent to the Senate except after ten
days notice in advance. Essentially it follows the Federal system.
Several other states, either through their legislatures, their bar associations, or combined groups, are currently considering proposals for
reform in the judicial selection process. These include Iowa, 5 Arizona,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. All of these states are thinking
of some form of the Missouri plan. The current trend, though by no
means a torrent, is toward this plan. In view of the fact, it is worthwhile to quote a summary of lawyer-attitudes and judicial reactions to it
in Missouri, based on that state's twenty-year experience with it. The
summary is part of a statement16 prepared by the American Bar Association's standing committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure and Compensation:
The operation of the Missouri plan is perhaps best reflected by the following points made by members of the Bar
who have spoken and written on the subject.
1. It has taken the Missouri courts out of politics as far
as that is possible to do. The judges may no longer contribute
time or money to political campaigns. They are no longer obligated in any respect to political parties or politicians.
2. A judge no longer has to be fearful of any of his judicial pronouncements displeasing the political bosses, because the
latter did not put him in office in the first instance and he (the
judge) is not dependent upon them nor is it necessary for him
to incur political obligations in order to remain in office.
3. As one judge, who served both under the old and new
systems, put it: "Political pressure has been taken off their
(the judges') backs."
4. Litigants are now actually receiving a higher quality of
justice, and the confidence of the people in the Missouri courts
has been restored.
5. There are now more better qualified men on the bench
than under the old system, and this includes most of the incumbent judges at the time of the Plan's adoption, since they no
longer have to be politicians in order to remain on the bench.
15.

This is another instance of a neighbor of Missouri proposing to follow the Mis-

souri plan. See 42 J. Al!. JUD. Soc'y 166 (1959) ; 43 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 27 (1959).
16. COMmITTEE REPORT, THE AIERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NON-PARTISAN PLAN

(195s).
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6. It has encouraged men to serve on the bench who
would not submit themselves to the ordeal of campaigning for
judicial office under the old political system, or who lacked the
means to finance such a campaign.
7. It has given security of tenure in office to capable and
conscientious judges with good records. It is now possible for
men to contemplate judicial careers.
8. It has promoted efficiency in the courts and speeded
up the administration of justice.
9. It is a decided improvement over the old political
elective system. Missouri now has a system of judicial selection and tenure which insures a thoroughly qualified and independent judiciary and has the confidence of the people.
Before a judge is selected in the first place is the time when we who
are not on the bench have a real chance to determine his judicial capabilities. It is the only real chance we have. We get what looks like a
second chance if he has to be named anew for subsequent terms in office,
but usually this is not much of a second chance, nor should it be, because
the values of judicial tenure make it undesirable to throw out a sitting
judge, short of retirement age, under any save extreme circumstances.
One significant aspect, or consequence, of this is that the quality of
judicial performance of a judge who is already seated is almost wholly
controlled either by his brothers on the bench, or by his own personality
and conscience, largely by the latter. That of course includes his inherent
capacities, and lack of them. The judge can be as industrious as he
pleases, or not very industrious, and get by with it, just so he does not
actually lay down on the job. He can concern himself in scholarly fashion
with the law, or put his main reliance on human analysis and evidence
and witnesses, and get by with either approach, just so he does not use
it exclusively. He may eschew politics wholly or participate in politics
somewhat, provided he does not do it too openly. He may observe the
Canons of Judicial Ethics rigidly, or he may skirt a bit about their edges.
He may approach the ends of justice blindly, or he may do it with his
eyes wide open to all the human factors in his cases. His total conduct
may be characterized by rigorous integrity, or he may cut some corners.
The administrative controls that are exercised within his court may
check some of his careless tendencies, may induce him to do a somewhat
better job than if he were left wholly on his own, but those are matters
inside the court, and it is his own conscience which in the last analysis
brings conformity even with administrative requirements. A judge is
expected to decide issues, including issues of his own conduct, on his own

THE QUALITY OF JUDGES

responsibility. If he does not go too far in the wrong direction (and it
is not always certain which direction that is), he will stay on as judge, he
will not be impeached, he will probably be re-elected if he has to stand
for re-election (unless his political party is thrown out bodily, an eventuality over which he has no control anyway), and he will probably be
honored as a jurist until he dies or retires, just because he holds the office,
whether his performance in it be great, or merely good, or mediocre.
The point I am making is that, once we have named a man as judge,
the quality of his performance as a judge passes almost completely outside our effective surveillance and control, unless his performance is extremely bad, or extremely unacceptable on some popular basis. The judge
himself has control of his performance, for all practical purposes, after
he is selected. Nine times out of ten, or nineteen out of twenty, we take
what he gives us, even though what we get may fall short of our judicial
ideals, or exceed our expectations. Any notion that the public, or the
bar, may have of exerting any genuine control over the quality of judicial performance by judges already on the bench (apart from raw instances) simply is not realistic. The one time when we have a real opportunity to exercise such control is before the judge is designated, when
we can base a check on his judicial potentialities on information about
him that passes out of the picture, never to be effectively replaced by
comparable information, once he goes on the bench. In the mass of instances the only chahce we have to decide whether we are going to have
a great judge, or a good one, or a mediocre one, is before we put the
new judge for the first time on the bench.
Of course it is true that, when judges are elected, they sometimes
fail of re-election when they seek second or subsequent terms. It might
be inferred from that fact that the public, or members of the bar who
are the public's advisors, do keep watch on judidial performance, and do
penalize by electoral defeat judges whose work was not as good as it
should have been. I fear that when we think seriously about the cases
in fact of judges being defeated for re-election under traditional election
procedures, we will have to admit to ourselves that quality of judicial
performance quite often does not have much to do with it. Defeats are
more often explained by the vagaries of politics generally, or by the personality and energy of an opponent, or by a modest judge's failure to
campaign vigorously because he thinks it unbecoming to his office, or by
the efforts of politically oriented economic interests or law firms which
hope to control a court or take control away from competing interests or
firms. Conceivably the judge's performance of his duties could be a
real issue in his re-election campaign, but rarely is it more than a surface
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issue. The real reasons for a judge's defeat are likely to have but little
to do with how good a judge he has been, in the average case. That
emphasizes again my earlier point, that the only real opportunity that we
usually have to check on a judge's qualifications, upon the likelihood of
his doing a competent, conscientious job as a judge, is before he enters
upon his judgeship in the first place.
If that is true, then the vital point in any good system of judicial
selection is the beginning of it, the part that determines who goes on the
bench in the first place. That is the part of the process which really decides, and properly ought to decide, whether or not we are going to get
the best men to serve as judges. After they once become judges, assuming that they do a reasonably good job, our concern should not be with
how the sitting judges can be gotten out of office, but also solely with
how they can be kept in office, subject only to the single condition that
there be some way, more efficient than impeachment, to get them out of
office if they turn out to be truly poor judges. Then at the end, of
course, there must be some provision for dignified and honorable retirement, to make sure that we do not have poor judges merely because of
the inroads of bad health and old age.
No judge was ever great because he was selected in a certain manner, but the manner of his selection may cause him to be less great than
he could have been had he been free of the limitations imposed upon him
by the circumstances of his selection. Neither brilliance, nor ordinariness,
nor conscientious industry, nor indolence, nor integrity, nor even plain
incompetence, was ever created in any man by the processes of his elevation to a judgeship. But incentives and motivations, and even obligations, are created by these processes of selection. There are few human
beings, be they lawyers or laymen, philosophers or politicians, or both,
whose conduct is not in some sense guided by the kinds of obligations
and incentives that can arise from one mode or another of judicial selection. A man capable of being a good judge, and naturally inclined to be
a good one, may be less good, or may even be a poor judge, because of
obligations created by the mode of his earlier selection, or because of
motivations arising from the method by which his future continuation in
office is to be determined. Or he may be a better judge, reaching upward toward the maximum of his inherent capabilities, because the obligations and incentives involved in the mode of judicial selection all look
in that direction.
Among the members of the bar in any state there are many more
lawyers inherently qualified to serve as judges than can ever become
judges. There are some whose inchoate judicial qualifications are ob-
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vious and outstanding, many others whose qualifications are genuine but
not so obvious. Then there are others whose disqualifications are equally
obvious, at least to those of us who know something about what it takes
for a lawyer to be a good judge. There are not enough judgeships to go
around, and there is no way we can assure every man a judgeship just
because he wants to be a judge and would make a good one. There is
no hope of such a heaven for judicially-inclined lawyers. We ask in fact
much less than that. The most we ask is that somehow we be reasonably
assured that the judges who are named will be selected from among the
group of those whose qualifications are either outstanding or substantial,
and not even in small part from the group whose disqualifications are
obvious. Further, we ought not to select our judges on the basis of wild
guesses as to their qualifications or lack of them, if there be available
any means by which a tolerably accurate judgment can be exercised in
advance as to whether the qualifications exist. There are so many good
judicial prospects among the members of our profession that there is no
earthly justification for using any system of selection that does not sort
out the prospects pretty accurately in advance. It is certainly fair to ask,
as to any method of selection that already exists or is proposed: Will it
achieve, or at least will it move in the direction of achieving, the designation of judges solely from among those of our number who will really
make good judges?
CONTINUING EDUCATION OF JUDGES AFTER THEY ENTER UPON
JUDICIAL DUTIES

There are few men who do not grow as responsibility is thrust upon
them, particularly if their responsibilities be in a field, such as the judiciary, in which dignity, devotion to duty, and a tradition of scholarly
service are characteristic of the job that is to be done. Few lawyers have
already lost the capacity to learn at the time they go upon the bench.
Almost any judge improves the quality of his performance tremendously
by the time he has been on the bench two years, five or ten years. Much
of this improvement, by the nature of things, comes from his own studying, as any judge must study. Much of it comes from his association
with other judges, first from his seniors on the same court, then from
all the other judges with whom he associates, in chambers, in judicial
conferences, at bar association meetings, and whenever he sees them. It
comes constantly from the work of lawyers who practice before him.
Probably most of it, however, comes from his own experience, because
any man who possesses a modicum of sense and wisdom will learn something from each piece of business he handles, each case he hears. All of
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this is self-education, which in a very real sense is what all education is.
But there are some areas in which the educative process, including
self-education, can be aided by making information, facilities and materials for study, opportunities for association and exchange of experiences, more readily accessible. This is true even as to judges.
Again, I want to fall back upon my own experience, to tell you a
little about an enterprise for judicial education that constitutes one of the
most fascinatingly interesting activities in America in recent years. This
is the Appellate Judges Seminar at the Institute of Judicial Administration in New York City. The idea for it came back in 1955 from Judge
Fred G. Hamley, then Chief Justice of Washington, now Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. His thought
was that there ought to be a short course, a seminar of some sort, available for Supreme Court judges, at which they could study and confer
about the working aspects of their job, just as such short courses are
available in most of the other specialized areas of our profession, and in
other professions too. I became Director of the Seminar almost by
default. We had our first session for three weeks in the summer of 1956.
Later we fixed on a close-packed two weeks period as preferable, and
have held one session each summer since then for approximately twenty
state Supreme Court and United States Court of Appeals judges, except
that in 1959 we held an additional session for the same number of state
intermediate appellate court judges.
The faculty for the Seminar includes both Law School teachers and
outstanding judges, to give a fair mixture of academic and professional
points of view. Judicial faculty members in 1959 were William J. Brennan, Jr., United States Supreme Court; Charles Desmond, new Chief
Judge, New York Court of Appeals; F. G. Hamley, mentioned above;
Frank Kenison, Chief Justice of New Hampshire; and Walter V. Schaefer, Illinois Supreme Court. Due to the large number of applications,
Seminar membership is now restricted to one judge from a court. Members for 1960 will be judges from the highest courts of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington
and Wisconsin. A judge of the Supreme Court of Canada will also be
a member.
The seriousness of the work done is illustrated by the fact that three
sessions, one and one-half or two hours each, are held daily. Extensive
reading assignments are prepared in advance. In 1959 the topics discussed were:
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Agencies Offering Services to Appellate Courts (1 session)
Nature and Function of the Judicial Process (5 sessions)
Preparation of Opinions (5 sessions)
Administrative Function of State Supreme Courts (4 sessions)
Current Trends in Negligence Law (3 sessions)
Techniques of Statutory Interpretation (1 session)
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1 session)
State Courts and the Federal System (2 sessions)
Appellate Review in Criminal Cases (2 sessions)
Appellate Control over Judge-Jury Relationship (1 session)
Appellate Review of Decisions of Administrative Agencies (1
session)
Appellate Courts As Supervisors of the Legal Profession (1
session)
As an example, the breakdown of subheads under one of the topics was:
Preparation of Opinions. Critique of quality of judicial
opinions (Wigmore's standards); efficient use of law clerks,
library, other facilities; exchange of ideas and materials among
members of court; conference procedure; concurrences and dissents; writing techniques; printing of opinions; assignment of
cases; use of oral argument; delayed rendition of opinions.
Similar breakdowns were made for each of the other topics. Discussion
was headed by two or three panel leaders on each subtopic, but with all
members of the Seminar participating in round table fashion.
The Appellate Judges Seminar"7 serves us here merely as an illustration of what can be done by way of making "continuing education"
more readily available to judges as well as to others in the legal profession. Another illustration is a project now under way to provide a sort
of handbook or reading guide for appellate judges, something which will
enable them to know about and more readily get hold of the rich literature not only on judicial administration but on jurisprudence, the nature
of the judicial process and all the other aspects of their jobs on which
almost every appellate judge is hungry for self-education.
The same sort of possibilities exist even more broadly for trial
judges. The mere fact that there are more of these judges increases the
possibilities. For them, seminars held on a one-state basis are practicable,
and probably in most circumstances preferable. They too have need for
17.
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systematic bibliographies of the literature that bears on their jobs, apart
from the literature of the law as such.
It is a rare judge who does not appreciate the need for further selfeducation, and strive for it constantly. All that I say now is that we
should try to make the facilities for such self-education more readily
available to them. The quality of our judges is not just an inherent
quality, pre-existent in the men themselves. It is something which in
almost every case increases itself as the judge continues to serve, throughout his active years, on the bench. But the rate of increase in quality will
inevitably to some extent depend on the opportunities which the judge has
to continue his education, not just in the courtroom but outside it too, and
the encouragement which the rest of us give him to take advantage of
those opportunities.
THE EDUCATION OF THE PUBLIC TO UNDERSTAND THE CHARACTER AND
IMPORTANCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND ITS FUNCTION IN OUR SOCIETY

This education of the public is in a very real sense what you are
undertaking now, in your Indiana campaign for nonpartisan judicial selection, and in the programs, the news stories, the editorial explanations,
the debates that will accompany it. When this campaign is over, the general public in Indiana will know more about your judiciary, what issues go
before it, the processes of decision, how it functions and why, and there-

fore what makes a man a good judge, than has been known before. Assuming that your campaign succeeds in establishing nonpartisan judicial
selection, as we all hope it does, the gain will be tremendous. But even if
nonpartisan judicial selection were rejected, there still would be substantial gains, because a great number of your citizens, perhaps a minority
but still a great number, will know much more about your courts and
your judges than they knew before. That alone will mean a gain in the
quality of judicial performance in Indiana. It will by itself have a very
real effect upon your judges. One of the surest ways to get better performance, maximum good performance, on the part of any public servant
is to let him know that good performance will be understood and appreciated by the public for which it is rendered. I suspect that the education
of the public as to the nature and function of our legal system, and particularly of our courts, is just about as important to the improvement of
their quality as is the education of the judges themselves. It is basic. In a
democracy it is the one, the only means by which progress can be assured.
And now I must conclude. I have talked about raising the quality
of our judiciary. Judicial selection and tenure is of course the basic problem. The one stage at which tangible control looking toward improve-
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ment can actually be exercised is the stage of original selection. Any program which is not directed at that stage is incidental, still preliminary, in
the nature of a step toward the main goal. That I believe is largely true
of your 1960 program here in Indiana. It is a step which you, in your
knowledge of the local situation, have wisely concluded that you must
take, and take before you try the longer and difficult leap to an ideal
method of judicial selection.
The quality of our judges, and of their performance in the judicial
process, is probably the surest guide to the quality of our civilization.
The quality of our judges is the quality of our justice. In a civilized
society the assurance of orderly and fair administration of something at
least approaching genuine justice is essential. This is a minimum to
which the people are entitled, which they demand. They look to their
judges for it, and for such improvement in it as their judges can give
them. But the ultimate responsibility, we well know, in a society which
includes an established legal profession, lies not upon the judges merely,
nor even upon the people, but upon the organized bar. The people look
to the bar for guidance, both as to who should be their judges and as to
how their judges can most wisely be selected. The judges themselves
are the direct product of the bar. As judges they are of about the same
quality as the bar that produced them, sometimes better than the bar's
average, seldom worse. To a large extent they are selected by the bar,
perhaps not formally but nevertheless actually. If the bar under some
prevailing system of judicial selection does not select the particular man
who serves as judge it nevertheless selects the type of man who is to serve.
One way or another it is our responsibility, state by state. Not all of our
states, through their bars, have accepted the responsibility, nor even
recognized it. The bar of Indiana has. May success crown your efforts!

